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Abstract: A Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) is a collection of low-power 
and lightweight wireless sensor nodes that are used to monitor the human 
body functions and the surrounding environment. It supports a number of 
innovative and interesting applications, including ubiquitous healthcare and 
Consumer Electronics (CE) applications. Since WBAN nodes are used to collect 
sensitive (life-critical) information and may operate in hostile environments, 
they require strict security mechanisms to prevent malicious interaction with 
the system. In this paper, we first highlight major security requirements and 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in WBAN at Physical, Medium Access Control 
(MAC), Network, and Transport layers. Then we discuss the IEEE 802.15.4 
security framework and identify the security vulnerabilities and major attacks 
in the context of WBAN. Different types of attacks on the Contention Access 
Period (CAP) and Contention Free Period (CFP) parts of the superframe are 
analyzed and discussed. It is observed that a smart attacker can successfully 
corrupt an increasing number of GTS slots in the CFP period and can 
considerably affect the Quality of Service (QoS) in WBAN (since most of the 
data is carried in CFP period). As we increase the number of smart attackers 
the corrupted GTS slots are eventually increased, which prevents the 
legitimate nodes to utilize the bandwidth efficiently. This means that the 
direct adaptation of IEEE 802.15.4 security framework for WBAN is not totally 
secure for certain WBAN applications. New solutions are required to integrate 
high level security in WBAN. 
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1. Introduction 
A Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) allows the integration of intelligent, 
miniaturized, low-power sensor nodes in, on, or around a human body to monitor body 
functions and the surrounding environment. It has great potential to revolutionize the 
future of healthcare technology and has attracted a number of researchers both from the 
academia and industry in the past few years. WBANs support a wide range of medical 
and Consumer Electronics (CE) applications. For example, WBANs provide remote 
health monitoring of patients for a long period of time without any restriction on his/her 
normal activities [1,2]. Different nodes such as Electrocardiogram (ECG), 
Electromyography (EMG), and Electroencephalography (EEG) are deployed on the 
human body to collect the physiological parameters and forward them to a remote 
medical server for further analysis as given in Figure 1. Generally WBAN consists of in-
body and on-body area networks. An in-body area network allows communication 
between invasive/implanted devices and a base station. An   
on-body area network, on the other hand, allows communication between non-
invasive/wearable devices and a base station.  
 
Figure 1. WBAN architecture for medical applications. 
 
The consideration of WBANs for medical and non-medical applications must satisfy 
stringent security and privacy requirements. These requirements are based on different 
applications ranging from medical (heart monitoring) to non-medical (listening to MP4) 
applications [3]. In case of medical applications, the security threats may lead a patient 
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to a dangerous condition, and sometimes to death. Thus, a strict and scalable security 
mechanism is required to prevent malicious interaction with WBAN. A secure WBAN 
should include confidentiality and privacy, integrity and authentication, key 
establishment and trust set-up, secure group management and data aggregation. 
However, the integration of a high-level security mechanism in a low-power and 
resource-constrained sensor node increases the computational, communication and 
management costs. In WBANs, both security and system performance are equally 
important, and thus, designing a low-power and secure WBAN system is a fundamental 
challenge to the designers. In this paper, we present a brief discussion on the major 
security requirements and threats in WBANs at the Physical, Medium Access Control 
(MAC), Network, and Transport layers. We analyze the performance of IEEE 802.15.4 
[4,5] security framework for WBAN using extensive simulations. Different types of 
attack on IEEE 802.15.4 superframe are considered in the simulations. The results are 
presented for smart, random, and weak attackers in terms of probability of failed 
Guaranteed Time Slots (GTS) requests (due to backoff manipulation attacks) in the 
Contention Access Period (CAP) period, number of corrupted slots in the Contention Free 
Period (CFP) period, and decrease in bandwidth utilization. It is concluded that smart 
attackers can successfully disrupt the entire communication channel in the network.  
The rest of the paper is categorized into six sections. Section 2 and Section 3 outline 
the major security issues and threats in WBAN. Section 4 describes the IEEE 802.15.4 
security framework for WBAN. In Section 5, we identify possible attacks on the IEEE 
802.15.4 superframe structure. Section 6 presents simulation results. The final section 
concludes our work. 
 
2. Security Issues and Requirements  
A WBAN is a special type of network which shares some characteristics with 
traditional WSNs but differs in many others such as strict security and low-power 
consumption. It is mandatory to understand the type of WBAN applications before the 
integration of a suitable security mechanism. The correct understanding will lead us 
towards a strong security mechanism that will protect the system from possible threats. 
The key security requirements in WBANs are discussed below. 
 
2.1. Data Confidentiality 
 
Like WSNs, Data confidentiality is considered to be the most important issue in 
WBANs. It is required to protect the data from disclosure. WBANs should not leak 
patient’s vital information to external or neighbouring networks. In medical applications, 
the nodes collect and forward sensitive data to the coordinator. An adversary can 
eavesdrop on the communication, and can overhear the critical information. This 
eavesdropping may cause severe damage to the patient since the adversary can use the 
acquired data for many illegal purposes. The standard approach to protect the data 
secure is to encrypt it with a secure key that can only be decrypted by the intended 
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receivers. The use of symmetric key encryption is the most reliable for WBANs since 
public-key cryptography is too costly for the energy-constraint sensor nodes.  
 
2.2. Data Integrity 
 
Keeping the data confidential does not protect it from external modifications. An 
adversary can always alter the data by adding some fragments or by manipulating the 
data within a packet. This packet can later be forwarded to the coordinator. Lack of data 
integrity mechanism is sometimes very dangerous especially in case of life-critical events 
(when emergency data is altered). Data loss can also occur due to bad communication 
environment.  
 
2.3. Data Authentication 
 
It confirms the identity of the original source node. Apart from modifying the data 
packets, the adversary can also change a packet stream by integrating fabricated 
packets. The coordinator must have the capability to verify the original source of data. 
Data authentication can be achieved using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) (to 
differentiate it from Medium Access Control (MAC), the Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) is represented by bold letters) that is generally computed from the shared secret 
key.  
 
2.4. Data Freshness 
 
The adversary may sometimes capture data in transit and replay them later using the 
old key in order to confuse the coordinator. Data freshness implies that the data is fresh 
and that no one can replay old messages. There are two types of data freshness: weak 
freshness, which guarantees partial data frames ordering but does not guarantee delay, 
and strong freshness, which guarantees data frames ordering as well as delay.  
 
2.5. Secure Localization 
 
Most WBAN applications require accurate estimation of the patient’s location. Lack of 
smart tracking mechanisms allow an attacker to send incorrect reports about the 
patient’s location either by reporting false signal strengths or by using replaying signals.  
 
2.6. Availability 
 
Availability implies efficient availability of patient’s information to the physician. The 
adversary may target the availability of WBAN by capturing or disabling a particular 
node, which may sometimes result in loss of life. One of the best ways is to switch the 
operation of a node that has been attacked to another node in the network.  
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2.7. Secure Management 
 
Secure management is required at the coordinator to provide key distribution to the 
nodes for encryption and decryption operation. In case of association and disassociation, 
the coordinator adds or removes the nodes in a secure manner.  
 
3. Possible Security Threats and Attacks 
A WBAN is vulnerable to a considerable number of key attacks. These attacks are 
conducted in different ways, i.e., Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, privacy violation, and 
physical attacks. Due to restrictions on the power consumption of the sensor nodes, 
protection against these types of attacks is a challenging task. A powerful sensor can 
easily jam a sensor node and can prevent it from collecting patient’s data on regular 
basis.  
Attacks on WBAN can be classified into three main categories [6]: (a) attacks on 
secrecy and authentication, where an adversary performs eavesdropping, packet replay 
attacks, or spoofing of packets, (b) attacks on service integrity, where the network is 
forced to accept false information [7], and (c) attacks on network availability (DoS 
attacks), where the attacker tries to reduce the network’s capacity. In the following 
section, we briefly present most important DoS attacks at physical, data link, network, 
and transport layers. A brief summary of these attacks is given in Table 1 [8].  
 
Table 1. WBAN OSI layers and DoS attacks/denfeses. 
Layers DoS Attacks Defenses 
Physical Jamming 
Spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower duty 
cycle, region mapping, mode change 
Tampering Tamper-proof, hiding 
Link 
Collision Error correcting code 
Unfairness Small frames 
Exhaustion Rate limitation 
Network 
Neglect and greed Redundancy, probing 
Homing Encryption 
Misdirection Egress filtering, authorization monitoring 
Black holes Authorization, monitoring, redundancy 
Transport Flooding Client Puzzles De-synchronization Authentication 
 
3.1. Physical Layer Attacks 
 
Some of the main responsibilities of physical layer include frequency selection and 
generation, signal detection, modulation, and encryption [9]. Since the medium is radio-
based, jamming the network is always possible. The most common attacks are jamming 
and tampering. Jamming refers to interference with the radio frequencies of the nodes. 
The jamming source can be powerful enough to disrupt the entire network. Tampering 
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refers to the physical attacks on the sensor nodes [10]. However, nodes in WBAN are 
deployed in close proximity to the human body, and this reduces the chances of physical 
tampering. 
 
3.2. Data Link Layer Attacks 
 
This layer is responsible for multiplexing, frame detection, channel access, and 
reliability. Attacks on this layer include creating collision, unfairness in allocation, and 
resource exhaustion. Collision occurs when two or more nodes attempt to transmit at the 
same time. An adversary may strategically create extra collisions by sending repeated 
messages on the channel. Unfairness degrades the network performance by interrupting 
the MAC priority schemes. Exhaustion of battery resources may occur when a self-
sacrificing node always keeps the channel busy.  
 
3.3. Network Layer Attacks 
 
The nodes in WBAN are not required to route the packets to other nodes. Routing is 
possible when multiple WBANs communicate with each other through their coordinators. 
Possible attacks include spoofing, selective forwarding, sybil, and hello flood. In spoofing, 
the attacker targets the routing information and alters it to disrupt the network. In 
selective forwarding, the attacker forwards selective messages and drops the others [11]. 
In sybil, the attacker represents more than one identity in the network [12]. The hello 
flood attacks are used to fool the network, i.e., the sender is within the radio range of the 
receiver.  
 
3.4. Transport Layer Attacks 
 
The attacks on the transport layer are flooding and de-synchronisation. In flooding, 
the attacker repeatedly places requests for connection until the required resources are 
exhausted or reach a maximum limit. In de-synchronisation, the attacker forges 
messages between nodes causing them to request the transmission of missing frames.  
4. IEEE 802.15.4 Security for WBAN 
IEEE 802.15.4 is a low-power standard designed for low data rate applications. It 
offers three operational frequency bands: 868 MHz, 915 MHz, and 2.4 GHz bands. There 
are 27 sub-channels allocated in IEEE 802.15.4, i.e., 16 sub-channels in 2.4 GHz band, 10 
sub-channels in 915 MHz band and one sub-channel in the 868 MHz band. IEEE 
802.15.4 MAC has two operational modes: a beacon-enabled mode and a non-beacon 
enabled mode. In the beacon-enabled mode, the network is controlled by a coordinator, 
which regularly transmits beacons for device synchronization and association control. 
The channel is bounded by a superframe structure as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. IEEE 802.15.4 superframe structure.
 
The superframe consists of both active and inactive periods. The active period contains 
three components: a beacon, a Contention Access Period (CAP), and a Contention Free 
Period (CFP). The coordinator interacts with nodes during the active period and sleeps 
during inactive period. There are maximum of seven GTS slots in the CFP period to 
support time critical traffic. In the beacon-enabled mode, a slotted CSMA/CA protocol is 
used in the CAP period. In the non-beacon enabled mode, the channel is accessed using 
unslotted CSMA/CA protocol.  
The main security requirements presented in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
specification are access control, confidentiality, frame integrity, and sequential freshness. 
Access control ensures the protection of frames from unauthorized nodes. Confidentiality 
makes sure that only legitimate nodes share the secret information. Frame integrity 
protects the frames from manipulation by an adversary. Sequential freshness confirms 
the freshness of the frames.  
The IEEE 802.15.4 security layer is handled at the MAC layer. The security 
requirements are specified at the application layer by tuning some control parameters. If 
no parameters are selected, no security mechanism is used. The specification defines four 
packet types: beacon, data, acknowledgement, and control packets. The beacon packets 
are used for synchronization and resource allocation. No security information can be 
included in the acknowledgement packets. In others, the information such as integrity 
protection and confidentiality protection can be integrated whenever required. The IEEE 
802.15.4 specification has a choice of security suites that control different security levels. 
Each security suite has different security properties, protection levels, and frame 
formats. The IEEE 802.15.4 based security suites can be considered for WBAN with 
necessary modifications. Table 2 lists different security suites defined in the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard [13]. They are broadly classified into null, encryption only (AES-CTR), 
authentication only (AES-CBC-MAC), and encryption and authentication (AES-CCM) 
suites. In AES-CTR, confidentiality protection is provided using Advance Encryption 
Standard (AES) block cipher [14] with counter mode. In AES-CBC-MAC, security 
including integrating protection is provided using CBC-MAC [15]. The AES-CCM 
provides high-level security that includes both data integrity and encryption. Details 
about these security suites are presented in the standard.  
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Table 2. Security modes in IEEE 802.15.4  
Name Description 
Access 
Control 
Confidentialit
y 
Frame 
Integrity 
Sequential 
Freshness 
Null No security     
AES-CTR Encryption only, CTR Mode X X  X 
AES-CBC-MAC-128 128 bit MAC X  X  
AES-CBC-MAC-64 64 bit MAC X  X  
AES-CBC-MAC-32 32 bit MAC X  X  
AES-CCM-128 Encryption & 128 bit MAC X X X X 
AES-CCM-64 Encryption & 64 bit MAC X X X X 
AES-CCM-32 Encryption & 32 bit MAC X X X X 
 
The IEEE 802.15.4 is considered very close to WBAN due to its quick implementation, 
reliable security mechanism, and support of low data rate applications with low cost of 
power consumption. A significant improvement has been seen in the IEEE 802.15.4 in 
terms of superframe variation (expanding the CFP period) and contention access 
mechanisms [16,17]. Since contention access mechanisms are not reliable for WBAN due 
to Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) and heavy collision problems, researchers have 
urged to shrink the CAP period in the IEEE 802.15.4 superframe and subsequently 
extend the CFP period [18]. The purpose was to carry loads of packets in the CFP part of 
the superframe. As discussed earlier, the IEEE 802.15.4 specification defines seven GTS 
slots for collision free transmission. A node interested to grab the slot tracks the beacon 
for resource allocation. The coordinator decides the assignment of the GTS slot. If 
needed, more than one GTS slot can be allocated to a node. Figure 3(a,b) shows the GTS 
allocation and deallocation process defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 specification.  
 
Figure 3. (a) GTS allocation process, (b) GTS deallocation process. 
 
(a)       (b) 
 
First, the nodes receive the beacons to identify the superframe boundaries. A GTS 
request is sent in the CAP part of the superframe to the coordinator. The request 
includes the required length and direction (uplink or downlink) of the GTS slot. The 
coordinator may send an acknowledgement packet to confirm the successful reception of 
the GTS request. If GTS slots are available, the coordinator assigns them to the nodes 
using the beacon frame. Once assigned, the data transmission takes place in the GTS 
slots of the following superframes. 
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The GTS allocation process may frequently occur in case of WBAN, where many 
nodes request the allocation of GTS slots. The main disadvantage of the IEEE 802.15.4 is 
the number of GTS slots is limited to seven. In WBAN, nodes generally require more 
GTS slots in the CFP period. This can be achieved by the varying the CFP duration 
according to the applications. No matter how many GTS slots are present in the CFP 
period, they have a vulnerable point that allows an attacker to disrupt the 
communication between nodes and the coordinator. Another problem is that the 
adversary may continuously select a small backoff window and may contend with the 
legitimate nodes (in the CAP period) in order to protect them from sending the GTS 
request packets. The following section briefly describes possible attacks on the CAP and 
CFP periods.  
 
5. Attacks on the CAP and CFP Periods 
Since most the traffic in WBAN is carried in the CFP period of the superframe, attacks 
on both CAP (this is used for resource allocation in CFP) and CFP periods can disrupt 
the entire communication between nodes and the coordinator. To attack the CAP period 
(also called backoff manipulation attack), a selfish node or an attacker attempts to select 
a small backoff window in order to keep the channel busy all the time. This attack 
prevents the legitimate nodes to send GTS slot requests to the coordinator as given in 
Figure 4(a). The backoff manipulation attack was first investigated for IEEE 802.11 
networks in [19], where a selfish user implemented a whole range of strategies to 
maximize its access to the medium. Most of the challenging task is to detect backoff 
manipulation attacks [20,21]. Because the backoff counter is selected on random basis, it 
is very hard to identify the adversary who has deliberately chosen a small backoff 
window. A scheme to detect backoff manipulation attack is presented in [21], which 
works well for adversaries who are unaware of the detection scheme. But a smart 
adversary can efficiently maximize his throughput and can minimize the chances of his 
detection [22]. Another method of detecting these attacks is proposed in [23] where the 
receiver is used to assign backoff windows to the sender but the problem is that receiver 
cannot always be trusted. To attack the CFP period, an attacker carefully listens to the 
GTS allocation process and extracts the GTS slot information from the beacon [24] as 
given in Figure 4(b). The attacker first synchronizes itself to the network and receives 
periodic beacons. Assume that the legitimate node sends a GTS request to the 
coordinator. The attacker waits for the following beacon to extract the GTS slot 
information. Once the coordinator approves the GTS request, it integrates the slot 
information into the beacon frame. Both the legitimate node and the adversary receive 
the beacon. After obtaining the GTS slot information, the adversary can easily create 
interference in the GTS slot. Since the GTS slots are used to carry critical data (life-
critical in case of WBANs [25]), interference in transmission affects the QoS 
requirements.  
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Figure 4. (a) Backoff manipulation attack on the CAP, (b) Attack on CFP period. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
6. Evaluation and Results 
We simulate a number of attacks on the CAP and CFP periods of the IEEE 802.15.4 
superframe using the NS 2.31 simulator [26]. The simulation is based on the framework 
defined in [24]. We consider a network of ten legitimate nodes, which can be randomly 
attacked by five attackers. The attackers are categorized into smart, random, and weak 
attacks. Smart attackers aim at corrupting both the CAP and CFP periods. They corrupt 
the GTS slot with maximum duration. Random attackers aim at corrupting CFP period 
only with an average GTS slot duration. Weak attackers aim at corrupting GTS slots with 
minimum duration. The attacks are triggered at random basis in each simulation run and 
the results are analyzed in terms of probability of failed GTS requests (due to backoff 
manipulation attacks) in the CAP period, number of corrupted slots in the CFP period, and 
decrease in bandwidth utilization.  
The smart attackers repeatedly attempt to access the channel in the CAP period, thus 
increasing the probability of failed GTS requests, as given in Figure 5. It can be seen that 
few smart attackers can disrupt the entire communication channel. Since the original 
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data transmission in WBAN takes place in the CFP period, analysis of attacks on the 
CFP period is becoming increasingly important.  
Figure 5. Probability of failed GTS requests. 
 
 
Figure 6. Total number of corrupted slots in the CFP. 
 
Figure 6 shows the total number of corrupted slots in the CFP period for a number of 
smart attackers. The figure shows that two smart attackers can successfully corrupt up 
to 149 GTS slots. This trend increases up to 1912 GTS slots for 30 smart attackers. Once 
the GTS slots are identified and attacked, the attackers try to decrease the bandwidth 
utilization in each slot. Corrupting more GTS slots result in the lowest bandwidth 
utilization. This corruption depends on the type of attacks. A smart attacker can corrupt 
more slots than a random or weak attacker. This is shown in Figure 7, where two smart 
attackers corrupt more slots and therefore decrease the bandwidth utilization by 71%. 
These are the best results in the attacker’s point of view (and worst for the legitimate 
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nodes). Two random attackers and one weak attacker decrease the bandwidth 
utilization by 49% and 15%, respectively. The later is the worst case for the attackers. As 
IEEE 802.15.4 networks may not frequently utilize the CFP period, the GTS attacks are 
not a big threat to them. But the direct adaptation of IEEE 802.15.4 security framework 
for WBAN is not reliable as most of the data is carried in the CFP period of the 
superframe.  
Figure 7. Decrease in bandwidth utilization. 
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7. Conclusions 
Starting from the WBAN security requirements at different layers, we studied the 
IEEE 802.15.4 security framework for WBANs and identified different types of attacks 
on the IEEE 802.15.4 superframe by a number of adversaries. These attacks were 
categorized into smart, random, and weak attacks. Simulation results showed that the 
smart attacker(s) has the capability of corrupting an increasing number of GTS slots 
compared to random and weak attackers. This means that the direct adaption of IEEE 
802.15.4 security framework for WBANs is not reliable since most of the traffic in 
WBANs is carried in CFP period, which is most vulnerable to GTS attacks.  
One of the solutions is to implement a sophisticated backoff detection scheme that 
should successfully detect the backoff attacks. However, the backoff detection scheme 
may not work for adversaries who have enough knowledge of the scheme. They may try 
to maximize their throughput and minimize their chances of detection. Another approach 
is to allow the receiver to assign the backoff window to the sender. In this scheme, the 
receiver can easily detect any attack and can even penalize the adversaries by increasing 
their backoff values. A game theoretic approach could also be useful to detect and 
prevent the attacks by considering that all nodes are selfish.  
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